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CRAG 3/4-62
1 March 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CENTRAL REFERENCE ADVISORY GROUP

A Proposed Central Requirements Facility in CIA

25X1 1. Attached is a copy of A Study of the CIA Requirements System by []
[] detailed by AD/OO to serve as Chairman of the Requirements Facility
Study Group.

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2. You will recall that this study was undertaken pursuant to CRAG 3/1-61 to assist CIA review what steps it should take in response to Joint Study Group recommendation #21, which states:

"The United States Intelligence Board establish a central requirements facility, initially to coordinate all requirements levied for clandestine and signal intelligence collection, and if successful, subsequently expand its operations to other types of requirements. Personnel assigned to this facility should be drawn from existing requirements personnel of the member agencies."

3. Except when attributed to others, the views and conclusions in []
report are his own. In the course of preparing the report he has been in close touch with every major component concerned with the processing of requirements. He therefore has on file considerable additional detail to back up his findings.

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4. Action: I suggest that CRAG members study this report and that we meet to discuss the findings and recommendations within a fortnight.

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PAUL A. BOREL
Assistant Director
Central Reference

cc: Assistant for Coordination/DCI

[]
Director/SCIPS
Secretary/CODIB

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1 March 1962

**A STUDY OF THE CIA
REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM**



Chairman
Requirements Facility Study Group

1 March 1962

**OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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A STUDY OF THE CIA REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM

BACKGROUND

During 1960 a Presidential Joint Study Group investigated, among other things, the intelligence requirement mechanisms of the United States Government. In its report (USIB-D-1.5/3 19 January 1961, TOP SECRET, Limited Distribution) it concluded that significant requirement problems exist in the Intelligence Community and recommended the creation of a national central requirements facility as the vehicle for solving these problems.

Since the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense concluded that implementation of the National Facility was impractical in the immediate future, as an interim measure the DD/I directed AD/CR to consider what improvements might be made in CIA in the areas raised by the Joint Study Group, including the feasibility of a CIA Central Facility. The present study was undertaken as part of that effort.

Specifically, the purpose of this study is to investigate the requirement mechanisms within the CIA to (1) identify the problem areas; (2) determine the seriousness of the problems; (3) make specific recommendations as to how and

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to what degree the JSG proposal should be implemented within CIA; and (4) recommend whatever remedial measures seem appropriate.

To gather the needed facts the existing CIA mechanisms were studied in detail. This was done principally by interviewing requirements and collection officers, research analysts, supervisors, and other appropriate officials known to be concerned with requirements and collection. In addition to gathering facts, ideas and complaints were solicited.

DISCUSSION

A. Description of the Existing CIA Requirement Mechanisms

In contrast to former years when essentially all foreign intelligence requirements were channeled through the central mechanism provided by the Office of Collection and Dissemination, requirements today are generated and levied on collectors in a variety of ways. Much of this change stems from the creation of specialized collection systems or the analyst's desire to deal directly with collectors.

For the purpose of this study the various ways of handling requirements are grouped into five categories as follows:

1. The Basic Central Requirements System

This is the classical coordinating and controlling mechanism which has been in existence since the CIA was created. Under this system requirement

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directives are generated by an individual analyst, approved by the production component and forwarded to the office requirement staff. Here the requirement is checked against similar needs within the office, typed on multilith mats and passed to the OCR Liaison Staff. The Liaison Staff, performing a central clearing house function, then records the requirement for control purposes, coordinates it with other agencies and serves it on appropriate collectors.

2. The Short Cut Route

For a variety of reasons, there has been a growing tendency in the Agency to short-circuit the requirements mechanism mentioned above. In contrast to former years, many analysts and production office requirement officers have direct relationships with collectors during the planning, selling, and levying phases of the requirement process. In addition, some analysts directly contact their counterpart analysts in other offices and agencies of the Government and, in a rough way, develop coordinated requirements.

There is no precise way of knowing what portion of ad hoc requirements get to the collector without having passed through the OCR central mechanism. Indicators available, however, suggest that the figure might be at least 40 per cent.

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3. Subject-Oriented Committees that Generate Coordinated Requirements (JAEIC, GMAIC, SIC, EIC, etc.)

In certain fields the CIA and the Intelligence Community utilize existing subject-oriented committees to develop requirements for the benefit of all agencies represented. Once the requirement is completed it is served on the collector in a variety of different ways. In some cases the joint requirement goes out to the collector for the benefit of all through the regular mechanisms in the particular agency in which the secretariat resides. In other cases, in addition to this procedure, committeemen levy almost identical requirements through their own requirement staffs. In other situations committees circumvent the regular channels and serve their requirements directly on collectors.

4. Groups which Generate Requirements, Develop Means of Collection and Collect Information (COMOR, COMINT,



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Since certain kinds of information can only be collected by highly specialized techniques, the CIA and the Intelligence Community have seen the need to develop special requirement and collection systems which

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operate almost independently of the classical requirement and collection systems. These groups often participate in the development of requirements, develop the means of collection, and in some cases participate in collection itself.

5. Requirements Levied on Collectors Orally

In this category falls the technique employed by those collecting current intelligence and high level officials of levying requirements on collectors orally. Usually such requirements are urgent in nature and transitory in value. Such requirements appear to comprise a relatively small percentage of the whole.

B. Problem Areas

In considering the complex and diverse methods of handling requirements in CIA, it becomes apparent that significant problems exist. The most important of these are reviewed below:

1. Overlap and Duplication

The problem of overlap and duplication of requirements is widespread in CIA (see Annex A). The root of the problem is that of overlap of interests and production responsibilities among CIA and Intelligence Community production components. This, coupled with the fact that most requirements in CIA are generated in isolation without precise knowledge as to what requirements

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are contemplated by others, what is currently being collected, and what has already been collected, adds up to considerable overlap and duplication. Beyond this, there is no effective system for screening out duplication or for consolidating overlapping requirements once such are set in motion.

For example, during the recent crises in Cuba which led to the abortive invasion, CIA and Community production components flooded the market with overlapping and to some extent duplicative economic and military requirements.

Precise measurement of the seriousness of this problem is not possible; however it was quite obvious during the study that overlap and duplication of requirements in CIA cause loss in manpower, tend to divert collection efforts away from the collection of other needed information, clog the repositories with duplicative basic information, weaken the importance of requirements, and slow the collection process.

2. Security Barriers to Efficient Utilization of Collection

Resources and Collected Material

For security reasons the Central Intelligence Agency maintains separate requirement and collection systems to collect certain "exotic" intelligence. While it is recognized that methods of collection need to be

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protected, it is also known that in the doing important information does not get into the hands of many who need it.* Moreover, without a knowledge of the capabilities of these systems, requirements may be inappropriately assigned. In some instances it was found that requirements were sent to the field for collection which involved some hazard and considerable expense when the precise information needed had already been collected. In rare cases this was found to be necessary for security reasons. Usually, however, this occurs because no mechanism exists to prevent it.

3. Lack of Adequate Collection Analysis and Planning

Today in contrast with former years, when basic data in almost every subject was required, the need more often than not is for the collection of specific hard-to-get information. This at once suggests that continuous attention be given to the best use of collection assets and to the planning, development and coordination of individual requirements. In the absence of such planned direction, some collectors, analysts and requirement officers

* This has been acknowledged by the Joint Study Group and remedial action is under way in accordance with JSG #14.

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individually seek out each other in an effort to resolve their own problems. Although this is a piecemeal approach, the result is often a much better and more realistic requirement. For the most part, however, even high-level technical requirements are generated in isolation and levied on collectors without knowledge of what assets might be available and without adequate supporting guidance.

4. Misuse of Priorities

The misuse of priorities is unquestionably most universally viewed as a problem. Basically this relates to the interpretation of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives. Some production components complain that even their most urgent requirements get little attention because the originator's mission is not easily tied to priority I, whereas components with "exotic" missions can attach the highest priority to relatively routine requirements.

The extent to which these allegations are true is difficult to determine. They point out, however, that a guidance gap* exists between the PNIOs and specific requirements. This gap permits similar requirements

* In the case of clandestine requirements, the new IPC list is an effort to bridge this gap.

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from different producers to bear different priorities and allows requirements of routine importance to be collected at the expense of requirements of greater value.

Also contributory is the fact that in the present system no provision is made for a reviewing body to objectively assess the importance of a particular requirement in terms of all other requirements. Rather, the sales ability of the analyst and the discretion of the collector are often the action determinants.

A priority-related problem of lesser stature, but of import nonetheless, is the absence of a standardized method for indicating priority on the requirement itself. Thus, some Community requirements bear the PNIO rating whereas others of equal importance do not. Or, the degree-of-need rating on requirement directives in some cases may indicate a "time" priority while in other cases be related solely to PNIOs. Sometimes the rating is intended to cover both.

The lack of clearly defined priority leads to the common practice of "selling" requirements to collectors. By personal persuasion, some analysts and requirement officers are able to convince collectors that their particular requirement is of high priority, or at least important and collectable, and needs prompt attention. In short, the over-all effect of

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such vying for the attention of collectors is that the best salesman gets the best results.

5. Unrealistic and Duplicative Collection Guides

Another confusing and serious problem is the generation of unrealistic and duplicative collection guides. Almost every major production component in the Community today produces its version of a collection guide. Other kinds of documents are often called guides, but the type usually referred to is a statement of subjects and items of interest to production offices. Collectors usually regard these guides as ready references and not as requirements they must strive to satisfy, despite the intent of the producer to have them so considered. Naturally the producer of the guide is frustrated when the collector does not regard it as a collection requirement.

In interviewing many analysts and collectors, it was noted that analysts ironically often spend considerable time and effort writing compendia which they believe will be of great value to collectors only to have these collectors show little interest and rarely make use of them.

In the case of the Clandestine Services, considerable selectivity is exercised in sending guides to the field. Most guidance documents are retained in headquarters and are brought into play if and

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when additional background information is needed to supplement a specific requirement. Contact Division/OO, on the other hand, sends most guides to the field. Those considered to be particularly helpful are incorporated into a numbered guide series and are referenced on published information reports. Others go to the field without being numbered.

During this study fifty guides were collected and collated according to subject matter. Not only was there duplication of subject matter, but a considerable part of it was word for word. Such duplication is a waste of manpower. More importantly it affects results adversely by devaluing the whole guidance program in the eyes of the collectors.

6. Weak and Ineffective System for Evaluating Information Reports

The evaluation of reports is an integral part of any successful requirements and collection system. Through systematic reports evaluation collectors are given needed encouragement, an indication of the reliability of sources, and direction in the course they should take. An evaluation program should also provide a means for management to assess the quality of reporting and the responsiveness of field collectors to levied requirements.

CIA's evaluation system falls short of achieving these goals. It is run on a completely decentralized basis with no provision for over-all

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assessment of the quality of the reporting or the responsiveness of collectors to levied requirements. There are also lesser problems. It was noted that some collectors tend to select those reports for evaluation which they already know to be of value so as to build up an accolade file for office use. Analysts on the other hand sometime hesitate to be critical of reports which they know to be of poor quality for fear of killing the goose which may one day lay a golden egg. Also noted: the collectors complain that they need to have more of their reports evaluated. This is in conflict with statements from analysts that they are already burdened with too many requests for evaluations or with requests from different collectors which tend to come in all at once.

C. Proposed Solutions

On the basis of expressions of those interviewed, there is widespread opinion that significant requirement problems exist in the CIA. Opinions as to what should be done, while varying in detail, in principle may be loosely grouped into four categories (see Annex B).

1. Maintenance of the Status Quo

A relatively few individuals interviewed, while recognizing the problems, doubt that anything can be done which would substantially improve the situation. Others, who also favor maintaining the status quo,

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are fearful of change on grounds that it would restrict freedom of movement in solving individual requirement problems.

Because the facts indicate that the problems need solution and, that solution is neither impossible nor contingent upon restriction of movement, the maintenance of the status quo does not warrant serious consideration.

2. The Committee Approach

A possible solution suggested by some is the committee method of generating coordinated requirements. The merits of this solution are said to be based upon the record of certain interagency committees in developing coordinated requirements. Lack of coordination is a major problem, why not extend the committee principle as the solution? Extension in limited subject areas indeed seems feasible and desirable. As a complete solution, however, it is inadequate because of its inability to deal with other problems discussed in this study and even to adequately perform the complete coordination function.

3. A High Level Policy Group

Another possible solution expressed by some is the creation of a high-level group to coordinate the over-all requirement and

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collection activities of the existing requirement mechanisms. Such a group, it is suggested, would regulate and manage the development of requirements and the collection assets to meet priority objectives. The creation of such a body has merit and could strike at problems related to lack of direction; being far removed from the collection process, however, it could not effectively deal with problems related to the generation, development and coordination of individual requirements.

4. A Central Requirements Mechanism

Realizing that the present decentralized methods of handling requirements are having an adverse effect upon the over-all collection effort, many of those interviewed believe that a more constructive approach to requirement problems lies in a kind of centralization. Not a central mechanism which would prevent direct relationships between analyst and collector, and insist that all requirements be developed and processed in the same manner, but one that, in addition to providing necessary coordination, would seek new methods and techniques to develop requirements and collection plans to meet specific needs.

Underlying the centralization concept is the strong conviction of many that a central facility should not be added as another layer between the analyst and the collector. Rather, it is argued, the requirement functions now performed by requirement staffs should be shifted

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to the proposed facility. Also many analysts and supervisors in production components think that such a central facility should be staffed in part by competent officers from production offices.

This kind of centralization has much to offer and would appear to fit the mood of the CIA.

CONCLUSIONS

A. There are serious requirements problems which negatively affect CIA's collection efforts to satisfy production needs; the diverse methods and mechanisms for handling requirements in CIA are not adequate to properly coordinate collection activities and to effectively cope with related problems.

B. The need for highly specialized information has resulted in the creation of new and variant procedures which without doubt have themselves caused many of the requirement problems. Some of the methods and mechanisms developed contain improvements over total reliance on the classical requirements mechanism. These improvements should be preserved.

C. There is need for more thorough coordination before requirements are served on collectors. This suggests central indexing of all requirements, checking against duplication and overlap, and, to the degree feasible, checking against information already collected.

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D. There is need for competent direction in the field of collection analysis and planning. This requires constant review of achievements and capabilities of collectors to make maximum use of existing and potential assets. It also suggests review and analysis of requirements against the Priority National Intelligence Objectives, and competent direction to develop the best possible requirements.

E. There is need for effective management with authority and responsibility to direct the requirement and collection effort, assign priorities, develop requirement policies, adjudicate differences, and concern itself with CIA and community requirement problems.

F. The solution to these problems is not reversion to the kind of centralization in which all requirements are generated, processed, and levied in precisely the same way. What is needed is management and machinery to see to it that each requirement is developed and levied in the most productive manner. This can be accomplished by a group at the Agency level to provide central direction, and another group at the working level to provide coordinated execution.


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RECOMMENDATION

That a CIA requirements committee and a central requirements facility be established and staffed to carry out the functions set forth in Annexes C and D to this report.



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Annexes

- A: Duplication and Overlap in the Generation and Levying of Intelligence Requirements
- B: Basic Facts and Attitudes Concerning CIA Requirements Systems
- C: Description of a Proposed CIA Requirements Committee
- D: Description of a Proposed CIA Requirements Facility
- E: Impact of Proposed Changes on Existing Organizations

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Annex A

DUPLICATION AND OVERLAP IN THE GENERATION
AND LEVYING OF REQUIREMENTS

It is extremely unlikely that a requirement system serving many hundreds of analysts could be developed in which there was no duplication and overlap of requirements. Even if it were possible it is unlikely that such a system would best serve the needs of the analyst or the Community. It is an obvious fact, however, that duplication and overlap can become excessive and deter rather than abet the collection effort.

It is a conclusion of this study that duplication and overlap within the Intelligence Community is excessive and is having an adverse effect upon the over-all collection program.* It appears to be less of a problem among CIA components than among Defense Agencies and between CIA and the other USIB Agencies. It nevertheless is a significant problem within CIA and one which demands attention. It is also a problem which cannot be solved in isolation; inasmuch as analysts must rely on USIB collectors to meet their needs, problems affecting any collector affects everyone.

* This was one of the major reasons the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created.

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Annex A

In arriving at the above conclusions, probable causes of overlap were investigated; appropriate individuals interviewed, ad hoc and guide requirements examined, and existing CIA mechanisms to prevent or screen out duplication and overlap reviewed. A brief description of these efforts follows:

Review of the Interests and Responsibilities of Research Components

Overlap of interests and production responsibilities appear to be the basic causes of duplication and overlap of requirements. To gain an appreciation of the extent of overlapping interests, the intelligence subjects listed in the Intelligence Subject Code were matched against the interests of production components throughout the Community. The results were interesting. It was found that at least two or more production components have an interest in almost all subjects on the list. In the scientific fields, and particularly those fields associated with weaponry, as many as nine different production offices have an interest in the same subject.

As another means of looking at basic causes, the intelligence production responsibilities of the major Community producers were compared. Here again, considerable overlap was noted.

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Annex A

Expressions of those Interviewed

As would be expected analysts rarely are aware of duplication and overlap as being a problem. Most of those contacted see no other requirements than those they produce themselves and have little or no basis for judgment. To some extent the same can be said of requirement officers within production offices. They do, however, screen out undesirable duplication and overlap from within their own offices and are fully aware of the problems. Most requirement officers contacted believed that a central facility to prevent and screen out duplicative requirements would be a desirable step forward. A few analysts expressed a different view. These were fearful of a central system which might prevent even completely duplicative requirements from going to the field. They argued that even though a requirement may already be in the field for collection, that if it did not originate in their own particular office, the response may not get back to them. A few others said that they liked to get on record as having an interest in a requirement even though it was already out for collection.

Collectors are in a much better position to observe the extent and effects of duplication and overlap. Most headquarters collectors

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Annex A

contacted consider it to be a serious problem and expend considerable effort to screen it out. The extent to which they do this, however, varies from collector to collector. Those collectors who must develop foreign assets at considerable cost are vitally concerned and go to much greater lengths to control it than do others. FI, for example, indexes incoming requirements and seeks to screen out undesirable duplication and overlap before it reaches the desks.

Probably those in the best position to report on the extent and effect of duplication and overlap are the requirement officers in OCR/Liaison Staff. Through this unit passes more than 50% of the CIA's requirements and virtually all outside requirements served on CIA collectors. Each of these officers interviewed recited case after case involving duplication and overlap which they considered to be wasteful and to some extent harmful to the collection effort. The most common kind of situation mentioned had to do with CIA requirements served on collectors only to have such requirements rejected because of similar requirements already in the field. Other expressions included instances wherein requirements were written to obtain information which was already

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Annex A

available in Washington repositories; instances of analysts having served requirements directly on collectors which either were inappropriately levied, or had already been levied on other collectors, and instances wherein similar requirements were levied separately on collectors which should have been consolidated.

An Examination of Requirements Now Outstanding

As a means of viewing duplication and overlap firsthand, several hundred "ad hoc" requirements and fifty "Collection Guides" were examined. From this examination it was found that some duplication and considerable overlap existed in both types of requirements, but that the situation is worse in the Collection Guides.

Representative of the kind of duplication and overlap which exists is the requirements recently levied on collectors pertaining to Cuba. In this particular sample, there is little exact duplication but considerable overlapping interest. This overlap of interest manifested by Army, Navy, Air Force, ORR, OCI and State all within a relatively short period of time, existed in six primary areas: The Cuban Economy, Sino-Soviet Bloc Technicians in Cuba, Sino-Soviet Bloc Trade with Cuba, Cuban

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Annex A

Security and Counter Intelligence Forces, Cuban Missiles and Air Forces, and Cuban Ground Forces.

Data on The Cuban Economy was requested by State. Specific subjects included living conditions, industry, transportation, agriculture and finance. The OCI Periodic Reporting List (PRL) requested information in all the same general categories although individual items were not all the same. ORR requested financial information pertaining to Cuban bank balances. State in its requirement requested similar financial information on a general basis.

Information on Sino-Soviet Bloc Technicians in Cuba was requested by ACSI; OCI, in its PRL requested similar information; ORR requested information on East German technicians and Bloc technicians in general. Air Force requested information on Bloc technicians training Cuban pilots.

Information on Sino-Soviet Bloc Trade with Cuba, particularly arm shipments, was requested by OCI in the PRL; ACSI requested data on Bloc arms shipments to Cuba in a requirement that was coordinated between State and ORR and then sent by each party to its own Agency collectors - the requirement from ORR going to FI and OO/C and

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Annex A

State requirement to numerous foreign service posts. An ACSI requirement on Cuban arm shipments was sent to Army collectors and at a later date a similar requirement coordinated with the above ORR-State requirement was also sent to Army collectors.

Data on Cuban Security and Counter Intelligence Forces was requested by ACSI and sent to Army, CIA, Navy, and State collectors; specific information on Cuban intelligence and security personnel, particularly in the Guantanamo area, was requested by ONI and sent to Navy collectors; Air Force requested information on Cuban intelligence. (It is safe to assume that there is a continuing requirement for this type of information in the DD/P, although it was not located.)

Information on Cuban Missiles and Air Forces was requested by Air Force in three separate requirements to CIA; the PRL requested similar information on Cuban Air Forces and Missiles; a Navy requirement expanding on the above Air Force requirement was sent to CIA; two ORR requirements requesting reinterrogation of sources of reports on missiles and air-to-air rockets were sent to FI; an ACSI requirement requests information on aircraft, missiles and pilot training.

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Annex A

Information on the Cuban Ground Forces was requested by ACSI and sent to CIA, ONI, AFCIN, and Army; ONI issued a requirement on Cuban ground forces which was similar to the Army requirement but differed in the emphasis on specific areas of Cuba. The PRL requested information on Cuban ground forces but most of the emphasis was on Bloc assistance and arms shipments, with some questions about morale and missiles. Both the Army and Navy requirements concentrated rather heavily on order of battle and anticipated actions or reactions.

Review of Existing CIA Mechanisms to Prevent Undesirable Duplication and Overlap

There is no effective means of preventing or screening out undesirable duplication and overlap in the CIA today. Individual analysts, requirement officers and collectors to a limited degree perform this function but rarely are in a position to do it on a Community basis. Requirement staffs within production offices prevent duplicative effort within their particular offices but have neither the capability nor the responsibility to consistently perform such coordination on the outside. The only other existing requirements organization is the OCR Liaison Staff. This organization serves as a channel through which part of CIA's requirements pass, but does not have the capability to perform this function.

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Annex B

BASIC FACTS AND ATTITUDES CONCERNING
CIA REQUIREMENT SYSTEMS

A. DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING REQUIREMENT MECHANISMS

Office of Research and Reports

Under the present system ORR maintains a central requirements staff (Requirements Branch) through which most of its requirements flow. The function of coordinating requirements, establishing priorities, and assigning requirements to collectors are performed centrally through this staff.

This staff negotiates freely with analysts and CIA collectors; it monitors the ORR "collection guidance program". Most of the requirements handled by the staff are channeled through OCR/LS. Some requirements, however, are served directly on collectors, usually with an information copy sent to OCR/LS. Some external coordination of requirements is attempted with other offices. Because of the complexity of such coordination, however, it is not common practice. This staff considers the fields of geodesy, guided missiles, communications and electronics to be areas in which there is particular need for more coordination with the Community.

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Annex B

In addition to a system for handling requirements centrally within ORR, there is also considerable direct contact between analyst and collector. This direct contact is particularly prevalent among those who need specific, hard-to-collect information. This was particularly noted in the Economic Area. Some such analysts who strike out on their own eventually coordinate their activities with the Requirements Branch; others do not.

Within ORR there are also several little requirement and collection systems which for a variety of reasons develop and levy requirements independently and in some cases participate in collection. Included in this



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In summary, the ways in which ORR requirements are generated, developed and levied, range from complete reliance on the classical system to direct collection by individual analysts.

Office of Scientific Intelligence

The OSI requirement structure differs from that of ORR in at least one important respect. In contrast to ORR, and as a result of a recent reorganization,

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Annex B

it chooses to maintain requirements officers on the division level (some full-time). In this system much of the negotiation with collectors and some internal coordination is done on a branch and division level. Then, when the requirement is in draft form, it is sent to the office requirements staff for office approval. After approval by the staff it is sent back to the division for typing and then returned to the requirements staff for assignment. Requirements ready for assignment are levied on collectors by the office staff. Some requirements to be served on the DD/P and most of those to be served on OO/C are levied directly; the bulk of the remainder are channeled through OCR/LS.

OSI also maintains a separate unit to coordinate ELINT requirements. These requirements, which almost all originate within OSI, are coordinated and then served on NSA.

Office of Current Intelligence

The OCI requirements structure is markedly different from that of either ORR or OSI. With the exception of a small unit to handle COMINT requirements, OCI maintains no office requirement staff at all. Accordingly, non-COMINT requirements are generated by individual analysts and channeled

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Annex B

directly to OCR/LS for collection. In former years the volume of such requirements was sizable. In recent years, however, probably because of the widespread use of the OCI Periodical Reporting List (PRL), such requirements are relatively few.

Another kind of requirement common in OCI is the oral requirement served directly on collectors (usually the DD/P). These requirements usually pertain to current intelligence and of necessity must be collected immediately. Individual analysts therefore often go directly to FI desks and state their immediate needs. The desks, in turn, send out the requirement in a telegram or cable and obtain the response in a matter of hours or days.

COMINT requirements, originating within CIA are also handled by OCI. These funnel in to a small requirements unit, are coordinated, and then sent to NSA for collection.

Office of Basic Intelligence

Only recently has the Office of Basic Intelligence submitted requirements. These are channeled through OCR/LS.

B. OPINIONS CONCERNING PRESENT REQUIREMENT AND COLLECTION SYSTEMS.

It is significant to note that most everyone interviewed was to some degree critical of present requirement and collection systems. In isolation individual

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Annex B

criticism may have little meaning; when repeatedly expressed, however, such information becomes significant and worthy of consideration when remedial measures are being sought.

An opinion most often expressed by analysts was that information reports resulting from requirements levied on collectors are on the whole disappointing. For many this deep-seated conviction has led to a feeling of hopelessness which appears to result in the initiation of fewer requirements to be levied on collectors. Such comments as the following are typical.

"I used to spend considerable time preparing and levying requirements. I don't do it much any more - it just isn't worth the effort. I can't remember when we last got a decent response."

"You would have to be a perennial optimist to keep submitting requirements that rarely pay off."

"In trips we have taken overseas we have found that field collectors often have a capability and express a willingness to collect the information we need, but our requirements don't reach them."

"All during the middle fifties we received practically no responses to our requirements. Those which didn't fall by the wayside in _____ lost out somewhere else. Now we rely almost entirely on open literature."

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For others, failure to obtain needed information has had a different effect. Believing that the fault lies largely with an ineffective requirements system, they are moving out on their own to solve their problems. Typical expressions of this group include:

"Today now that I go directly to the collectors (headquarters) the situation is a little better. At least we know that our requirements aren't completely ignored."

"I don't care what kind of a system is set up but I'll tell you this much, the day your middle man fails to get the job done, we'll be back out there again doing it ourselves."

"There's nobody out there in the middle who can give us any real help. They're always yammering about putting a requirement in a language that a collector can understand. I tell you I can get more 'understanding' out of a thirty minute session with a collector than the whole lot of 'em."

A complaint repeatedly expressed by analysts is that collectors give too much attention to the collection of unsolicited information of marginal value and too little attention to collecting information really needed. Typical of these complaints are such statements as these:

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"The collectors are living in a different world. Why don't they stop collecting all the drivel that we don't ask for and concentrate on what we need."

"This isn't 1950. What we need today is specific answers to specific questions and not a lot of junk which our files are already full of."

Another complaint has to do with accountability. There is widespread feeling among analysts that collectors tend to be capricious in the handling of requirements; that they accept no real responsibility and collect only when conditions are most favorable.

Collectors too have opinions as to what is wrong with requirements and collection. One common expression is that duplication in both ad hoc requirements and guides is a perennial problem which is only partially subject to control; it is a problem which hinders the collection process.

FI collectors complain that, even with the new IPC list, many requirements are submitted for clandestine collection which properly should be assigned to overt collectors. An additional complaint: analysts do not understand that more than a mere statement of gaps is needed to develop

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a requirement; unless there exists a specific field collection capability and adequate supporting guidance, the chances of collection are indeed remote. While upholding the idea that face to face contact between analyst and collector is desirable, FI collectors indicated that some such contact is unnecessary and inordinately time consuming.

C. OPINIONS AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

During the interviewing phase of this study those contacted were made aware of several possible reorganizational changes in the requirements structure. They were then asked what changes, if any, they thought should be made in light of what they considered the problem to be.

Whereas opinion varied as to what should be done, there was widespread agreement with the JSG position that some central control was necessary to manage requirements and to cope with every increasing problems. In expressing such belief, a few did so reluctantly and thought of centralization as something they didn't want but had to have. A far larger group, however, while anxious to impose safeguards to prevent the creation of a monster, thought of it as a service organization that could work for producers and collectors alike for the benefit of all.

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The following expressions (some paraphrased) relating in one way or another to the creation of a central requirements mechanism are representative of those interviewed:

"We believe that a central facility should bring analysts and collectors closer together. If it can't do this we don't want it."

"The present 'central facility' in OCR is nothing more than a channel. What this agency needs is a service outfit which not only can coordinate requirements but can give real assistance in developing and selling requirements."

"We can see the logic in a central facility, but I must admit that we are a bit fearful of losing control over the requirement officers who handle our requirements. We would be much more satisfied if some of the officers assigned to it were chosen by us and remained on our payroll."

"Don't make the mistake of staffing a central facility with people who remain on somebody else's payroll. If they don't serve both the producers and the collectors, get rid of them, but don't keep them under different management."

"We like the idea of a strong central facility which can help develop good requirements. It will fail though if it doesn't have good people. If

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you let people choose their own candidates it will become a central dumping ground."

"If you want a central requirements facility to work, don't let 'special' situations arise in which some requirements are allowed to get to the field without going through the facility. If you do, it will fail, just like the OCR central system has failed."

"We like the idea of the central register within the facility. This alone we think will do much to prevent duplication and overlap."

"In any new system we set up we ought to see to it that there is machinery to do something about such high-level problems as priority, the regulation of collection and the settling of differences. A central requirements group should have power to do these things."

Not all persons interviewed favored the central facility concept. A few of these held to the view that the present trend toward decentralization should be continued. Representative expressions of this type include:

"We believe that what is good for us is good for the whole. We've worked hard to set up a little system to take care of ourselves and we don't believe anybody else can add one thing to it."

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"I fear centralization in requirements just like I do centralization in government. They always give you a lot of promises of results but in the end its me that gets hurt."

"I recognize the fact that there are many requirement problems with us today. I sincerely believe, however, that little can be done about them. No matter what you do the problems will still be with us."

Other expressions worthy of note include the following:

"Why must we always try to find grandiose solutions for all our problems. Why not chip away piecemeal at our present system seeking solution to the toughest problems first."

"I'm in favor of a central requirements facility but only on a national level. Why must we set up a CIA central facility first?"

"I believe the only serious problem we must lick is the coordination of requirements. I believe the way to do that is by extending the interagency committee principle. By this means well thought out and coordinated requirements can be developed."

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Annex C

DESCRIPTION OF A PROPOSED CIA REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE

1. The CIA Requirements Committee*

The mission of the proposed committee would be to coordinate the over-all requirements and collection effort of the Central Intelligence Agency. It would concern itself with management and regulation of requirements and collection, and the development of requirements and collector capability to meet priority objectives. Its responsibilities would include the following:

- a. To review requirements designed to meet high-level priority objectives and, as needed, direct the initiation of studies to develop comprehensive collection plans based on analysis of existing or potential collection assets.
- b. To maintain current knowledge of collection capabilities of the Community, recommend reallocation of responsibility, and the creation of new collection capability as appropriate.

* In determining what sort of high-level body might best meet needs, a USIB level committee was seriously considered. Inasmuch, however, as the interim plan calls for separate requirement programs for both DIA and CIA and, since DIA already has a high-level priorities board, a USIB committee may be premature.

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c. To serve as an appeals board to adjudicate differences relative to requirements and collection problems.

2. The committee would be directly responsible to the DDCI and make recommendations thereto. In its own right, however, it would regulate, make policy, and deal directly with collectors and requirement facilities.

3. Representation on the committee should include high-level members from DDI and DDP components and a representative from the proposed CIA Central Requirements Facility.

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Annex D

DESCRIPTION OF A PROPOSED CIA REQUIREMENTS FACILITY

1. Mission

The proposed facility would provide the Central Intelligence Agency with a central mechanism to coordinate and levy requirements. Its primary mission would be to see to it that each requirement is developed and coordinated in the best possible way to meet Community needs.

In performing this mission, the responsibility of the facility would vary greatly from requirement to requirement. In cases involving routine requirements, or those developed by interagency committees, only a minimum of additional direction and coordination would be needed. In other situations, considerable effort would be expended in bringing people together, dealing with analysts and collectors and developing comprehensive collection plans. In every case, however, the facility would perform basic coordination functions and serve as a channel through which all* requirements were centrally indexed and levied on collectors.

* Even though the facility would be all source, for security reasons there may be occasions when extremely sensitive requirements should not be channeled through it. Whenever the phrases "all requirements" or "every requirement" is used in this annex, this possible exception should be taken into account.

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2. Basic Responsibilities

a. Coordinate all requirements as appropriate checking against undesirable duplication and overlap, information already collected, and current interests of other production components.

Comment: This function would be performed (1) by both analysts and facility officers using the machine controlled requirements register to determine what requirements pertaining to a given subject were already being collected; (2) by giving other components the opportunity to contribute to a requirement before transmission to collectors; and (3) by determining that the information sought is not already available in USIB repositories.*

b. Give direction and guidance as needed in the planning and development of requirements.

* Under CIA's present system of retrieving information, checking to determine if information is already available is a time consuming task and one which must remain the responsibility of the analyst. On a sample basis, however, as a means of monitoring this activity, the facility might initiate checks on its own.

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Comment: This would involve a thoroughgoing knowledge of all collection assets available and an ability to guide analysts accordingly. It might entail the bringing together of analysts and collectors and an ability to direct and produce studies to develop collection plans to make the best possible use of collection assets.

c. Provide a central machine controlled register* to index all requirements.

Comment: Such a register would provide (1) formalized management control of all requirements; (2) subject and area index listings of requirements outstanding within the Community; and (3) on an ad hoc basis hard copies of all requirements outstanding.

d. Assign priorities consistent with Priority National Intelligence Objectives and degree of need.

* Such a register has been under development since April 1961 (see CRAG 3/2-61) and is ready to begin operation.

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Comment: Analysts would continue to suggest desired priorities on each requirement but the facility would make the final judgment as to what that priority should be.

e. Provide the channel through which all collection requirements originating within CIA or served on CIA by other USIB members for collection action are placed in proper format and served on collectors.

f. Develop and administrate a centrally controlled program to evaluate information reports.

g. Serve as an action body to seek solutions to CIA requirement problems and to represent CIA in the solution of Community problems.

h. Monitor and report actions taken on all requirements and maintain case histories thereon.

3. Location

The proposed central requirements facility would be established on a division level and located within the Office of Central Reference.

Comment: In making this decision the possibilities of making the facility a DCI or DDI staff were also considered. It was concluded, however, that because of continuous need for

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machine and registry support that it could best be administrated in OCR.

4. Basic Staffing Pattern

It would be staffed by highly competent officers drawn from production, collection and requirements components. For purposes of close liaison and cooperation with the Defense Intelligence Agency, military officers should be assigned to duty on the staff.

A basic cadre of officers, supporting clerical staff, and the registry personnel would be permanently assigned to the facility and the remainder of the staff assigned on a rotational basis and remain on the T/O of their parent offices.

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Annex E


IMPACT OF PROPOSED CHANGES ON EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS

The reorganization proposed in this paper would necessitate numerous changes, the more important of which are discussed herein. Detailed procedures to effect these changes would be worked out before the proposed facility became operational.

Office of Current Intelligence

1. CIA requirements for COMINT collection action would flow directly from the originator to the central facility from whence they would be levied on NSA.

2. OCI would provide professional officers experienced in COMINT collection to administrate the COMINT requirement program. These officers would have special communications clearances and be permanently assigned to the facility. Technical assistance to support the COMINT requirements function would be provided by OCI.



4. With respect to long range COMINT guidance, currently the COMINT Requirement List (CRL), this would be prepared and coordinated within CIA

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by the central facility. Interdepartmental coordination would be accomplished by the CIA member of the COMINT Committee (Chief, SPINT/OCI).

5. Non-COMINT or collateral requirements originating in OCI would flow directly from individual analysts and components directly to the facility.

6. Requests for bits of information which demand rapid reporting on current developments would continue to be transmitted directly to collectors orally. Copies of outgoing telegrams and cables resulting therefrom would be forwarded by the collector to the facility for indexing.

7. OCI/SPINT would serve as a point through which the facility could deal on COMINT matters.

Office of Scientific Intelligence

1. The basic requirements functions now performed by the Reports and Requirements Branch would be transferred to the central facility. Except for possible administrative control on an office level, all OSI requirements would flow directly from the divisions (or individual analysts) to the central facility. Direct contact, as needed, would be maintained between analysts and facility officers.

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2. CIA requirements involving ELINT collection (almost all originate within OSI) would flow directly from the originator to the central facility from whence they would be levied on NSA.

Office of Research and Reports

1. The basic requirement functions now performed by ST/I would be transferred to the central facility. Except for possible administrative control on an area or office level, all ORR requirements would flow directly from the divisions (or individual analysts) to the central facility for levying on collectors. Direct contact, as needed, would be maintained between analysts and facility officers.

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Office of Central Reference/Liaison Staff

Historically CIA requirements functions and liaison functions have been performed by OCR/Liaison Staff (formerly Liaison Division). In the proposed reorganization these functions would be separated. Liaison would remain with OCR/LS and the requirements functions be performed by the central facility.

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Requirements Involving Sensitive Means of Collection

A capability would be developed and maintained within the central facility to make proper use of available collection media and repositories. With this ability requirements would be reviewed against all possible means of collection. In addition, without revealing sensitive means of collection the facility could (1) advise analysts as to the probability of collecting particular information; (2) give assistance in writing up suitable requirements; (3) send out requirements for fulfillment; and (4) get the resulting information to the analyst.

Subject-Oriented Committees that Generate Requirements

When interagency committees are used to develop requirements, the CIA or DIA central requirements facilities would be used to provide support and basic coordination. Later, when the requirement was completed, it would be channeled through the CIA or DIA central facilities for collection as appropriate. If it were channeled through the DIA, a record of the action (IBM card) would be forwarded to the CIA facility for filing.

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